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be altogether without interest to the specialist, and that it will find its way into the schools of pedagogy (the subject of the art of education being also incidentally dealt with in its pages).

Dr. Kroman's method of presentation is concise and lucid; the elements of logic occupy but some one hundred and four pages, and form a good introduction to the common phases of that science.

But his psychology is, from our standpoint, more open to objection; or rather his philosophy. He says: "Unless we assume the law of causation, research is impossible; but assuming this, it is impossible to stop with states of consciousness, we must assume a subject and *real* objects." What Dr. Kroman means by *real* is seen from the following. "Our senses give us knowledge only of *properties* of things, not of *things*. We do not perceive the apple, but only its form, color, etc. But all these sensations thus derived form an interconnected whole; and the law of causality forces us to the assumption of a *thing* behind these sensory manifestations. Yet, our belief that we know this *thing in itself* has only a practical value; in reality it is an unknown quantity. It is a single point, a nucleus, of which *direct and positive* knowledge is unobtainable; yet exist it must if our assumption of the law of causation is to be upheld." Thus Dr. Kroman shows in an admirable manner how our everyday conceptual life *is* formed; but it is the office of philosophy, in our view, to point out how this same conceptual life *should be* formed. However, Dr. Kroman supplements this explanation—which we have much abbreviated—by considerations that lead one to believe that he seeks only to demonstrate the reality of existence and has collaterally accepted the doctrine of the independent, 'outside' thing in itself. We may refer our readers, regarding this question, to Prof. Mach's article in this number of *The Monist*. укрк.

EINLEITUNG IN DIE PSYCHOLOGIE NACH KRITISCHER METHODE. By *Paul Natorp*.
Freiburg: J. C. Mohr.

In this exhaustive monograph Dr. Paul Natorp does not deal with psychology itself, but proceeding from a number of novel points of view he opens up the road by which the principles of psychology may be reached. The author frankly assumes that psychology even as yet has not absolutely and clearly defined its own *fundamental problem*, and that this is chiefly the reason why we still disagree concerning the significance and value of many of the results of psychology. Before we approach the solution of the special problems, psychology *itself* must be laid down as a problem. The author, therefore, in the first part of his introductory task has sought to indicate the *objects* of psychology,—namely, what it will and rationally can pursue; and in the second part, he points out the only correct *method* according to which psychology can accomplish its aims.

Since Descartes, says our author, real and possible consciousness constitutes the true limits of the province of psychic research, the fundamental problem of psychology, and the characteristic distinction between the old and new philosophy.

But, in order to find out, whether this tendency of the new philosophy has been entirely successful, it will be necessary to examine more closely the nature of the fundamental psychic phenomenon, and the problem that it involves.

In the fact of consciousness we can distinguish several elements which really are inseparable, but which in the study of the problem ought to be separated. There is the content of which one is conscious, and secondly, the consciousness thereof, or its relation to the ego; and, by a further abstraction, this relation itself might be distinguished from the total fact of consciousness. The relation to the ego, in ever varied contents, is one and the same; it makes up both the common and specific element of consciousness, and as the third abstract element of consciousness (*Bewusstsein*) it might aptly be called self-consciousness (*Bewusstheit*). The ego, being a common point of relation to all contents of consciousness, cannot itself become the content of consciousness, because it represents a contrast to any idea of content. We do not correctly conceive consciousness as a thing, a cause, a force, an explanatory principle, but simply as a phenomenon—the fundamental phenomenon of psychology. We thereupon ask, what contains this phenomenon, and by what is it characterised? It is, above all, characterised by *subjective* experience. This denotes, that it is *I* who am conscious of a content. The reflective expression "I am conscious" implies a "subject" that is conscious. Without this reflective relation to the ego, consciousness no longer conveys any meaning. Consciousness denotes *self*-consciousness. This reflective relation is therefore the only distinctive mark of all conscious phenomena.

Content we call anything that can be related to the ego. In the language adopted by psychologists, a feeling or a desire can also be regarded as content of consciousness. But our investigation cannot proceed beyond this reflective relation. If we attempt a *representation* of the ego, we should turn it into *object*, and we should have ceased to regard it as *ego*. The ego is never an object—not even to itself.

It is not denied, that in every consciousness there can be distinguished two elements—the existence of a content, and its relation to the ego; but it is denied, that this relation can be made objective, even to itself. This correctly describes the character of consciousness, as content and activity, and moreover, precisely delimits the domain of the psychical and determines the *positive* task of psychology. Those, who assume a consciousness of consciousness, ought logically to admit the consciousness of a consciousness of consciousness, etc.; as indeed some metaphysicians have done.

It may be maintained, however, that the distinction of the activities of consciousness, of sensation, representation, and thinking, is indispensable in psychology; but, at any rate, there are no different *kinds*, or even degrees or stages of consciousness. The consciousness of any simple sensation in kind is not different from the consciousness of a world; the factor of consciousness in both is the same;

the difference lies exclusively in the content. This also applies to clear and obscure consciousness.

In order to determine the positive task of psychology, we ought to discover in every content and in every repeated act of consciousness, a certain common characteristic. Perception, as such, does not constitute consciousness, but merely denotes the presence of a multiple content; apperception, on the other hand, indicates only consciousness in the definite sense of a "unity" of that multiple content. This unity of consciousness properly does not appear, or only appears in the connection of the contents. That peculiarity of consciousness which we call apperception, is psychologically only apparent in the contents of consciousness; it does not constitute an object of psychology, but forms only its extreme limits. The common characteristic of every content of consciousness is therefore really to be found in the *connection* (*Verbindung*) in which the simple contents are represented in the repeated acts of consciousness. This connection exists only subjectively, irrespective of all objective meaning or value.

The existence of phenomena purely as phenomena, their subjective existence irrespective of object, constitutes their psychic existence or that side of the phenomenon from which it becomes an object of psychological research. Under this head come all those phenomena to which science denies an objective value: illusions of the senses, mental hallucinations, and the normal non-scientific representations of things, the creations of the imagination in music and in art, the entire subjective life of feeling and of aspiration, regarded only as a particularly characteristic association of representation, irrespective of all objective truth, which lies beyond the limits of psychology as such.

The characteristic, accordingly, is found in the *unity* in which the content represents itself in the single or reiterated acts of consciousness. In each act of consciousness the content is simply present, and no time is distinguished. When we distinguish time, a plurality of consciousness also must be distinguished. It may seem difficult to understand how two or more original acts of consciousness are again united into one act; but in reality this takes place. The idea of unity is thus enlarged, and becomes the consciousness of a multiplicity, the necessary unity of a multiple, a successive connection in time, and a simultaneous connection. All consciousness (representation) depends on connection, as is indirectly shown by trying to discover whether the elementary contents of consciousness can be represented in absolute isolation.

Abstract consciousness is thus found to be the relation of given contents to an ego, and connection constitutes the manner in which a multiple content appears or is represented in the reiterated relation to one and the same ego. Connection is the *concrete expression* of that relation itself, through which consciousness attains its definite and positive value. Abstract consciousness seems poor, but the multiplicity of a definite connection of contents affords a vast field of psychological re-

search, for on that connection depends the concrete significance of the ego, which to us is not subject in general, but above all, is our own particular subject.

And finally at this point there spontaneously arises the question of a theory of the psychic phenomena. Every theory essentially presupposes an *objective* tendency, while consciousness, as the expression of the purest *subjectivity* of phenomena, cannot be rendered objective. It clearly follows, therefore, that the *method* of psychology must be radically different from all methods of the objective sciences.

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DER GENIALE MENSCH. By *Cesare Lombroso*. German Translation by Dr. M. O. Fraenkel. Hamburg: Verlagsanstalt und Druckerei-Actien-Gesellschaft (vormals J. F. Richter).

The French edition of Lombroso's "Man of Genius" has already appeared. The work is introduced by a preface written by M. Charles Richet, which reviews the subject with great clearness. All in all, this is an admirable book, well stocked with interesting facts and incidents, and well adapted to obtain a large number of readers outside of scientific circles. There is necessarily a dearth of abundant and well-authenticated facts in this subject,—historians until lately not having occupied themselves with the psychological phases of life; and accordingly there is great danger in universal generalisation from those that we have. This, however, Prof. Lombroso has recognised.

Genius, the author claims, is a variety of psychosis, an instance of degeneration. Degeneration of certain parts is the condition of the acquisition of others; thus the loss of a number of ribs and muscles, of a tail, etc., has in man been compensated by the acquisition and development of the brain; and so in the genius the possession of very great intellectual or emotional faculties has been counterbalanced by the loss of equilibrium in the other parts. Moreover, there are no exceptions in nature; the occurrence of insanity, abnormalities, and eccentricities in a few cases leads us inevitably to the conclusion that there are correspondent defects in all others. And this we find to be true in all historical instances. Popular speech and tradition have identified genius and demency: in Hebrew and Sanskrit the words prophet and insane are synonymous; and so we have the proverbs—'Children and fools speak the truth,' 'Un fol avise bien un sage,' 'Saepe etiam est morio valde opportune locutus.' The line of demarcation between the two is hardly traceable. Genius is the exception, a deviation from the common type of humanity, and nature avenges the aberration by denying it permanency and inflicting upon it abnormality. Whether degeneration or progression, genius is unusual and unstable. But one thing distinguishes genius from mental alienation, and it is this—that genius possesses the power of inhibition, of concentration, of *critique*, and far-sightedness, while demency has no control of the ideas it has formed; both possess the swift and unerring power of origination; the one can command what it has originated, the other cannot.